Abstract Ensuring reliable elections and increasing the public's trust in the election process are perhaps the two most important responsibilities of our federal, state, and local governments. In most jurisdictions in the United States, elections are managed, configured, and conducted using closed-source and proprietary electronic voting machine software and equipment. Proponents of electronic voting systems argue that these systems are faster, more reliable, more accessible, and more secure than existing voting technologies. This talk discusses the security properties of electronic voting machines, and in particular, highlights numerous discovered vulnerabilities that call into question whether our trust in electronic voting systems is warranted. In particular, this talk presents the findings from two government-commissioned academic studies of electronic voting machine equipment: the California Top-to-Bottom Review, the first academic review of voting systems in which investigators had access to the systems' source code and developer documentation, and the Ohio EVEREST report, a study of the security and reliability properties of the remaining major voting machine systems that were not included in the California review. In both instances, we found numerous exploitable vulnerabilities in nearly every reviewed system and component. These security flaws enable an attacker to alter or forge precinct results, install corrupt firmware on touchscreen and optical voting hardware, forge paper audit trail entries, and erase electronic log records. In addition to enumerating discovered security flaws, this talk also highlights some of the architectural weaknesses of deployed electronic voting systems, and discusses potential mitigation strategies. Speaker Bio Micah Sherr is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Pennsylvania. His academic interests include privacy-preserving technologies, electronic voting security, wiretap systems, and network intrusion detection. He received his PhD in computer and information science from the University of Pennsylvania.