Abstract Given the range of spyware's capabilities, any exploitable network device with a microphone or camera has the potential to become a surveillance bug. Currently, most vulnerable devices, such as laptops and smartphones, continue to lack mechanisms to prevent unauthorized microphone or camera access. While such a threat is not a new concept, it is reaching critical mass as more laptops contain built-in microphones and cameras and have an increased presence in the business and personal world. Such an attack can be executed as soon as the target connects to the Internet from anywhere in the world. If this type of exploit incorporates a botnet framework, then the compromised devices could form a scalable sensor network. This would enable the attacker to remotely monitor any person close to a compromised device. In this presentation we empirically investigate remote stealthy surveillance threats to Windows XP and Mac OS X laptops. This type of attack does not require user interaction and is hard to detect. We then present a technique to mitigate the Windows XP threat, as well as a novel method to deceive an attacker in order to permit traceback. The overall goal is to address a missing segment of resource control and illustrate the increasing complexity for privacy concerns as exploitable devices become more pervasive. Bio Ryan Farley is a first year PhD student in Computer Science at George Mason University. Prior to GMU he received his Master's degree in Computer Science at Wake Forest University, where he also received his Bachelor's degree. Outside of academia Ryan was involved in several startup companies and an internship at IBM Research Zurich. His current research with Dr. Wang focuses on VoIP topics. This includes identifying threats and attempting to provide security against remote attacks on the underlying protocols.